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Introduction
A mosque manager (takmir) at 
Masjid Raya Baiturrahim Jayapura 
City told me that some Salafi-Wahabi 
preachers had taught Islamic teachings 
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Abstract
Papua has experienced the threat of communal harmony between Christians and Muslims 
regarding the transnational Islam advent in Papua. The Tolikara Incident in 2015 and the 
latest one the banning of building the minaret of the Al-Aqsha Mosque in Sentani in 2018, 
to a certain degree, were part of transnational Islam influence in the region with a majority 
non-Muslim population. The presence of transnational Islam cannot be separated with the 
emergence of the public sphere in the country after the demise of the Suharto regime in 
1998. This paper will explore transnational Islam in Papua by reviewing previous study and 
discourse on transnational Islam in Indonesia. At the outset, the author will delve literature 
review on transnationalism and transnational Islam globally. Afterward, it will discuss the 
presence of transnational Islam, especially Salafi of Jafar Umar Thalib (JUT) in Jayapura and 
Keerom that has created tension and hostilities within Muslims communities, as well as toward 
non-Muslim. No doubt, Salafi faction of JUT has tried to promulgate or disseminate radical 
Islamic teaching through dakwah (propagation) and other activities that threaten Papua Land 
of Peace (Papua Tanah Damai). As a result, their presence has gotten resistance from some 
Islamic mass organisations and non-Muslims. 
Keywords: Transnationalism, Salafi, Papua Land of Peace, Religious Conflict
in the mosque. Unfortunately, these 
teachings of Islam have created tension 
between fellow Muslims. Due to 
the frequent discussions of bidh’ah 
(innovations) of other Islamic groups, 
43
Ridwan
the takmir eventually “expel” them 
out from the mosque. This story above 
is heart-shattering and hardly ever 
publicly discussed. 
 Furthermore, the above story 
shows the phenomenon of the presence 
of transnational Islamic movements 
in Papua has triggered tensions with 
other Islamic organizations (and non-
Muslims), especially in Jayapura City. 
This needs to be studied seriously 
because there is still little study about 
it. Therefore, this paper will examine 
the transnational Islamic movement 
in Papua by taking a case study of 
Salafi faction a la Jafar Umar Thalib. 
I will start this paper with a study of 
Transnational Islamic terms and its 
brief development in the world and 
Indonesia.
Discussing Transnationalism and 
Transnational Islam 
The term transnationalism is not 
new, but today it is more widely used 
in the field of social sciences. Randolp 
Bourne used the term for the first time 
in his (1916) article “Transnational 
America,” to mean the articulation of 
his “visionary new form of pluralism” 
(Nichols, 2009, p. 217), as well as 
“cosmopolitanism” as part of the study 
of transnationalism in international 
relations that focus on border-crossing 
actors or networks (Malet and 
Anderson, 2017, p. 4). 
 Even though, as Masud observes, 
the phenomenon of transnationalism has 
existed at least as long as imperialism, 
Piscatori has argued that it is only since 
the 1970s that theorists of political 
science and international  relations have 
taken an interest in transnationalism’s 
impact on nation-states: “The obvious 
common supposition was that nation-
states were the decisive components of 
international affairs” (Piscatori cited in 
Masud 2000, p. xiv). 
In the early 1970s, Keohane and 
Nye (1971) drew attention to the 
new processes that were resulting in 
multidirectional linkages across state 
boundaries. In the early 1990s, the 
term transnationalism was introduced 
in anthropology, sociology and 
cultural studies to describe phenomena 
associated with global transformation 
occurring around the world (Vertovec, 
2003, 2009). 
The increased interest in 
transnationalism as a topic of study 
has been tracked by Gustavo Cano 
(2005). Cano examined the Social 
Science Abstract Database and found 
that almost two-thirds of the articles 
that mentioned “transnationalism” or 
“transnational” were published between 
1998 and 2003. The expansion of the 
study of transnationalism coincides with 
the increased study of globalisation 
(Vertovec, 2009, p. 2). Stiglitz (2002, 
p. 9) defines globalisation as “the 
closer integration of the countries 
and peoples of the world which has 
been brought about by the enormous 
reduction of costs of transportation 
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and communication, and the breaking 
down of artificial barriers to the flows 
of goods, services, capital, knowledge, 
and (to a lesser extent) people across 
borders”. In defining transnationalism, 
Keohane and Nye (2000) emphasize 
the terms “interdependence”, 
“globalisation,” and “globalism”. 
Interdependence and globalization refer 
to “an increased sense of vulnerability 
to distant causes” (P.105). Meanwhile, 
globalism means “a state of the world 
involving networks of interdependence 
at multicontinental distances” (p. 105). 
In a similar vein, Hannerz (2000) 
emphasised a distinction between 
globalisation and transnationalism, 
pointing out that the latter refers to 
actors who are individuals, groups, 
movements, corporations, rather than 
states as corporate actors as in the case 
of globalisation. However, when the 
processes of globalisation evolve and 
deepen, “transnationalism” provides 
a good explanation of world politics 
carried out by an increasingly wide 
range of non-governmental social forces 
organised across sovereign boundaries 
(Mandaville 2010). In the same vein, 
Roudometoft (2005, p. 113) argues 
that transnationalism involves “several 
layers ranging from the construction of 
transnational spaces to the formation of 
transnational communities”. 
By recognising that 
transnationalism has a broad meaning, 
I chose transnationalism in this paper 
referring to “communities of outlook 
that include persons and organisations 
that share common world views, 
purposes, interests, and practices which 
they communicate and act across 
national borders and jurisdictions” 
(Juergensmeyer, 2005, p. 193). So, 
the definition is a cultural other than a 
political definition of transnationalism. 
In this context, transnationalism is 
applied to religion as well.
However, studies on 
transnationalism have not devoted 
much attention to religious phenomena 
in political science and international 
relations. James (2017) noted that 
transnational studies scholars have 
generally ignored the role of religious 
organisations. These studies mainly 
focused on economic globalisation, 
political processes, migration issues, 
terrorism, violence, organized 
crime and culture. Thus the study of 
religious movements in the context 
of transnationalism and consequently 
on international relations has been 
somewhat confused because religion 
and international relations are based 
on two different assumptions. James 
(2017, p. 8-9) maintains, “First, 
Western modernity is premised on 
the understanding that the world of 
government and international relations 
is basically a secular one; second, 
religion has always had a universalistic 
tendency to operate beyond national 
borders”. This is probably because 
the international relations literature 
dealing with transnational linkages and 
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penetration mainly focuses on political 
and economic security (Haynes 2001, p. 
146).
According to Yasmeen (2005, p. 
45),  study of International relations 
has ignored the role of religion because 
since the end of World War II, the 
dominant approach in the discipline, 
that is realist paradigm approach had 
prioritised national interests between 
the state and political entities. In this 
regard, religion and culture have no 
place in world politics. The rise of 
neo-liberal ideas in the late 1970s, 
which recognised the relationship of 
transnationalism between state and 
society did not change the situation, 
where religion still has no a place in the 
discipline of international politics.
Transnationalism and Religion
Scholarship on transnational 
religion can be traced back to the late 
1990s. Rudolf and Piscatori (1997, p. 
1) observe: “Religious communities are 
among the oldest of the transnationals: 
Sufi orders, Catholic missionaries, and 
Buddhist monks carried words and 
praxis across vast spaces before those 
places became nation states. Such 
religious travellers were versions of 
civil society playing their roles across 
the borders”. 
To date, studies of transnational 
religions have been undertaken 
by many scholars (Hayness 2001; 
Werbner 2003; Levitt 2004; Sing 2013; 
Mensah et al 2013; Juergensmeyer, 
2003). Haynes (2001) argues that 
Islam and Christianity are examples of 
transnational religious communities, 
both of which existed before the 
emergence of secular states. Christianity 
and Islam grew as world religions that 
developed throughout the world because 
of colonisation, conquest and the 
growth of worldwide trade. 
In a similar vein, Werbner (2003, p. 
897) showed that religious movements 
have never been constrained by 
international boundaries, by arguing 
“Sufism and Christianity spread as 
proselytizing religions, preceding as 
well as following Muslim and European 
imperial expansion into Asia and 
Africa”. According to Juergensmeyer 
(2003, pp. 7-8), “they are ‘religions of 
expansion’ despite their geographical 
and cultural roots being in one locality”. 
This reemerged as politically important 
from the late 20 century, invigorated 
by globalization and the accompanying 
communication revolution. 
Studies of transnationalism and 
religions have developed in many 
regions and are not limited to Islam 
and Christianity, as explained below. 
Transnational religions in the United 
States related to immigration have 
been studied extensively by scholars 
such as Ebaugh (2004) and Levitt 
(2004). Ebaugh describes transnational 
religious ties between immigrants in 
six American religious congregations 
in Boston. Levitt (2004, p. 2-3) also 
discusses patterns of transnational 
religious organisations. 
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Some scholars (Sing 2013; Kitiarsa 
2010; Jaffrelot and Therwath 2007; 
Roniger 2010) have studied religious 
transnationalism in Judaism, Hinduism, 
Buddhism and Sikhism. Roniger (2010) 
examines the impact of transnationalism 
to Jewish identification and identities. 
He indicates that transnational factors 
have maintained a presence in Latin 
American Jewish life since the 
establishment of the State of Israel, 
the period of the Cold War and into 
the contemporary world. Jaffrelot and 
Therwath (2007), using the example 
of the Hindu nationalist movement, 
argue that there are the implications 
of political entrepreneurs in the 
country of origin and the instrumental 
dimension of long-distance nationalism. 
Similarly, Kitiarsa (2010) maintains that 
Buddhism, like other world religions, 
is a transnational religion, because “the 
transnationalization of Thai Buddhism 
since the late twentieth century has 
emerged out of global cultural junctures, 
where missionary intent and monastic 
networks have joined forces” (p.109).
According to Haynes (2009) some 
transnational religious actors helped to 
create international order. For instance, 
the Roman Catholic Church from the 
1980s, by using a liberation theology, 
encouraged authoritarian regimes to 
democratize in Latin America and parts 
of Central and Eastern Europe and 
Africa. Additionally, the Organization 
of the Islamic Conference (OIC) played 
a role in helping to promote dialogue 
and cooperation between Muslim and 
Western governments. 
However, some transnational 
religious actors, such as al-Qaeda 
and Lashkar-e-Taiba have threatened 
international order (Haynes 2012). The 
impact of religious transnationalism 
on international order has attracted 
attention in the post 9/11 era (Snyder, 
2011; Ress, 2011; Sandler, 2004; 
Yasmeen, 2005). There is growing 
acknowledgment that the study of 
religion, including transnational 
Islam, occupies an important place 
in international relations. The Bali 
Bombing in 2002, the Madrid Bombing 
in 2004 and more recent attacks in Paris, 
Barcelona, Belgium and London add 
to this realization. This is reflected in 
the literature published on transnational 
Islam and its political implications.  
Transnational Islam 
The term ‘transnational Islam’, 
according to Bowen (2004, p. 880) 
refers to three phenomena, namely, 
demographic movements, transnational 
religious institutions, and the field of 
Islamic reference and debate. In the 
first phenomenon, transnational Islam 
can be defined as ‘Muslims may move 
across national borders for social and 
economic reasons’ (p.880). The second 
phenomenon of transnational Islam 
has meant that ‘some Muslims belong 
to religious institutions that either 
promote cross-national movements 
as part of their religious practices or 
encompass and promote cross-national 
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communication within their religious 
hierarchy’ (p. 881). Then, the third 
phenomenon of transnational Islam 
is more focused on ‘the creation of 
networks, conferences and increasingly 
formalized institutions for systematic 
reflection among scholars’ (p.882). The 
last two phenomena are related to each 
other due to the movement of religious 
institutions involving the transfer of 
ideas.
Slightly differently, Grillo (2004, 
p. 865) defines the three types of 
transnational Islam: Transnational 
Islam=Islam within transnational 
circuits, Transnational Islam=Islam 
within a bi-national/plurinational 
framework, and Transnational 
Islam=the umma. An example of the 
first type includes Muslim immigrants 
to Italy and France from West Africa 
(Mali, Mauritania and Senegal). They 
work in both countries and maintain 
religious ties in West Africa. Then, the 
second type refers to how “Those living 
and working abroad are also bound 
(legally, economically, politically) by 
the circumstances of two nation-states: 
where they reside (`here’, France and 
Italy), and whence they came (`there’, 
Senegal, Mali, Mauritania)” (p. 865). 
It is not surprising that the 
transnational Islamic practices are 
embedded in network relations between 
migrant setting and departed homeland. 
Muslim people and organisations send 
money back to fund mosques, schools 
or charity work in their countries of 
origin. In this regard, Schmidt (2005) 
used the term diasporic to describe 
religious activities that maintain 
network ties between migrants and their 
homeland.   
Meanwhile, the third type, 
according to Grillo (2004) transnational 
Islam as the umma, means transnational 
Islam goes beyond a particular 
migration circuit or diaspora towards 
the imagined community of Muslims 
at large, either within one society or 
across many (p. 865). In this sense, 
transnational Islam is an extension 
of the umma, a term connected with 
the imagined Islamic community 
(Mandaville, 2001). The umma in some 
ways is an imagined community, but 
it also exists in reality. Allievi (2003) 
showed that some Turkish mosques 
in Germany, Switzerland and France 
have assisted needy Turks in Italy to 
purchase an apartment for their prayers, 
which then became the first Turkish 
mosque in Italy. Another example is 
internal solidarity amongst Muslims in 
the event of conflicts, as in Bosnia or 
Chechnya, not to mention Palestine. 
In this sense, the umma works as 
a framework to maintain religious 
unity and accommodate the cultural 
diversities of believers. In addition, 
the umma is very much in tune with 
contemporary globalisation trends, as 
well as becoming an inherent source 
of political instability and unrest in the 
modern Muslim world (Hassan, 2006). 
With its expansion, globalisation 
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state and non-state actors; thereby 
religious actors are able to spread their 
messages beyond borders. In addition 
to that, Wajdi (2015) discusses one of 
the lesser known Turkish transnational 
piety renewal movements that have 
recently reached Indonesia: the 
Süleymancıs, founded there in the form 
of an organisation called the United 
Islamic Cultural Centre of Indonesia 
(UICCI). This provides an example of 
how a Turkish Muslim transnational 
organisation comes to project itself into 
a new cultural environment (a non-
Turkish diaspora context) and adapts to 
that new context.
Transnational Islam in Indonesia
Studies on Islam and politics in 
Indonesia, including radical Islam, 
developed rapidly after the demise of 
the Suharto regime’s New Order in 
1998 (van Bruinessen, 2002). Mubarak 
(2008) shows that the New Order did 
not tolerate radical Islamic groups with 
dreams of building an Islamic state. The 
emergence of political liberalization in 
the Reform Era (1998 onward) paved 
the way for the emergence of radical 
Islamic groups that had lain dormant 
during the New Order Era. 
Basically, two types of radical 
Islamic groups emerged during this 
post 1998 era. First were the open and 
visible organisations. These movements 
are easily identified because their 
founders, members and centres for 
activities are transparent. In addition, 
necessitates “deterritorialisation”. 
According to Appadurai (1996), 
globalisation involves increasing 
deterritorialisation of global flows. 
In short, Appadurai’s notion of 
deterritorialisation is based on the 
crossing of territorial boundaries, 
and suggests that globalization is 
tied to geographical movement. In 
this case, globalisation had created 
the deterritorialisation of Islam (Roy 
2004, p. 18). Roy introduced the term 
“Globalized Islam” as a new trend of 
Islam that is individualized, uprooted 
from social and cultural contexts and 
transnational. In other words, the main 
idea of this argument is that some 
Muslims in Europe have lost their 
links to the original culture of the first 
generation or no longer diasporic.
Recently, there is an intimate and 
direct link between globalisation and 
the rise and development of Islamic 
transnational networks. Münster 
(2013) mentions that the presence of 
transnational Islamic groups has some 
kind of network structure; Hizbut-
Tahrir, Muslim Brotherhood, Fethullah 
Gülen movement, and others suggest 
that globalization facilitates the 
formation of organized transnational 
groups. For instance, Mohamed Osman 
(2010) mentions that Hizbut-Tahrir 
Indonesia (HTI) has links with other 
Hizbut-Tahrir in other parts of Southeast 
Asia, such as Malaysia and Singapore. 
Similarly, Haynes (2009) maintains that 
globalization provides links between 
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transnational Islam emerged in the late 
2000s. The term found its momentum 
when there was active promulgation 
of anti-democratic rhetoric by some 
Islamic groups, in particular HTI. 
A book Ilusi Negara Islam (Illusion 
of Islamic State) made the term 
transnational Islam more popular 
(Wahid, 2009). The book discusses 
how Wahabbi groups have operated 
and infiltrated mosques, hospitals 
and schools belonging to NU and 
Muhammadiyah in Java, Indonesia. 
In addition, it reveals that Tarbiyah 
Jemaah created the Islamist Prosperous 
Justice Party (Partai Keadilan 
Sejahtera, PKS) in Indonesia and how 
it inherited the ideology of Ikhwanul 
Muslimin from Egypt. Similarly, 
Rahmat (2005, 2017) examined the 
influence of the ideology of PKS based 
on Ikhwanul Muslimin, from college 
mosques to the legislature in Indonesia. 
Al-Makassary (2013) wrote on the 
infiltration of transnational Islam in 
mosques located in the government 
offices in Jakarta and its surroundings. 
Some scholars have studied 
transnationalism that has a relationship 
with Salafi-Wahhabi groups in Indonesia 
(Hasan, 2005; Desker, 2002; Jahroni, 
2015; Iqbal, 2016 and Chaplin, 2018). 
Generally, those studies tell us about 
the emergence of Salafism in Indonesia, 
its dynamics and its implications for 
religious intolerance, mainly in Java. 
Desker (2002) maintains that Jemaah 
Islamiyah, Front Pembela Islam (FPI) 
they recruit membership openly. This 
category of open groups includes those 
that emerged from Indonesia and those 
that are affiliated with transnational 
Islam in the Middle East. Home grown 
groups, include Laskar Jihad Forum 
Komunikasi Ahlus-Sunnah wal-Jama’ah 
(LJ-FKAWJ), Front Pembela Islam 
(FPI), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia 
(MMI), and other small radical groups. 
Those with Middle Eastern ties include 
Jama’ah Ikhwanul Muslimin (JAMI) 
affiliated with Ikhwanul Muslimin 
(Muslim Brotherhood) in Egypt, and 
Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) a branch 
of Hizbut-Tahrir, created by Syaikh 
Taqiyuddin Nahbani in Jerusalem in 
1953. The second category consists of 
closed or underground organisations. 
These groups are difficult to identify 
and they recruit membership secretly. 
Jamaah Islamiyah is included in this 
category. 
Those movements above seem have 
no relationship with moderate Islamic 
groups, such as Muhammadiyah and 
Nahdhatul Ulama (NU). According 
to Wahid (2009), the radical Islamic 
groups or transnational Islamic actors 
have no connections to mainstream 
Islamic mass organisations in Indonesia 
such as Muhammadiyah and NU. The 
radical groups, then, including their 
political wings, have agendas that differ 
quite sharply from both mainstream 
Islamic mass organisations (Rahmat, 
2017). 
In Indonesia the use of the term 
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movement of the Middle East, 
“Salafiyun” is a new term, and it is 
not easy to identify when it begins. 
Salafi is not a mazhab (a school of 
Islamic thought) such as Mazhab 
Hanafi; neither is it an organisation 
like the Islamic Brotherhood in Egypt. 
Instead, it is a spirit that has spread to 
the Islamic world since the period of 
Tabi’in (…) and it was well-known 
as “Al-Salaf” or “Ahl Al-Atsar” that 
challenged “Ahl Al-Ra’yi” and “Al-
Mutashawwif”. The salafi is called as 
“Ahlul Hadits”, or the followers of 
Ahmad bin Hanbal, as opponents of 
Ahlul kalam in aqidah (creed), and Ahl 
ar’Rayi in fiqh (jurisprudence).
Shaikh Al-Islam Ibn Taimiyya 
and his followers were the most active 
proponents in spreading, maintaining 
and creating opinions, as well as 
explaining salafi teachings in aqidah 
(creeds), fiqh (jurisprudence) or akhlaq 
(ethics). Imam Abdullah ibn al-Qayyim 
was one of his best students. Both 
Shaikhs wrote a rich literature for Salafi 
in their period, as well as for the interest 
of Salafi followers after them.    
In the contemporary era, Salafi was 
reborn through the reformer of Salafiyah 
in Saudi Arabia: Shaikh Muhammad 
ibn Abdul Wahhab. This Salafi faction 
has a distinct character that is to fight 
all forms of syirk and khurafat.  Ibn 
al-Wahhab wanted to free umma from 
bid’ah where many people did not 
follow Salafi path. In addition, Ibn 
al-Wahhab denied the interpretation of 
and Laskar Jihad exemplify the extreme 
manifestation of the Salafi-Wahhabi in 
Indonesia all of which justify violence 
against enemies of Islam. These 
groups identify themselves as Salafi 
and promulgate a utopian vision, the 
creation of a new caliphate or Islamic 
states through revolutionary violence. 
The presence of these groups challenged 
moderate Islamic organisations, such as 
Muhammadiyah and NU.
Following the typology of 
Mandaville, as mentioned above, the 
rest of this section briefly describes 
three transnational Islamic actors in 
Indonesia that belong to the category 
of ‘deterritorialised’ radical groups: 
khilafists and Salafı-jihadis, namely, 
Jemaah Tarbiyah, Salafi groups and 
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI).  Here, 
the author only present the Salafi 
Wahhabi groups in the country.
Salafi-Wahabbi Groups
One of the transnational Islamic 
actors in Indonesia is Salafi Jemaah. It is 
more appropriate to call them ‘jamaah-
jamaah Salafiyun’ (Salafi groups), 
because Salafi never becomes one 
group. Historically, there is no official 
institution that unites Salafiyun. In some 
countries, there are some factions of 
Salafi, such as Jama’ah Anshar As-
Sunnah Al-Muhammadiyah in Egypt 
and Sudan or Jam’iyyah Ihya’ At-Turats 
Al-Islami in Kuwait, or Laskar Jihad 
(Jihad Brigade) of Jafar Umar Thalib in 
Indonesia (Hasan, 2007, 2018).
In the contemporary Islamic 
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Wahhabism was doomed as a peripheral 
historical event that did not have a 
strong influence on Islamic theology.     
In the early 20th century, Abdul 
Azis bin Saud revived salafiyah’s 
doctrine by joining Ihkwan, a militant 
rebellion, in the beginning of the 
formation of Saudi Arabia. Wahhabism 
was a doctrine of limited influence 
until the middle of 1970s, when a large 
increase in the price of oil, combined 
with an aggressive approach by the 
Saudis to spread Wahhabism had 
resulted a dramatic effect on the spread 
of Wahhabism in the Islamic world.   
Wahhabism did not spread its 
doctrines as an Islamic thought or 
specific orientation in Islam, but called 
itself “the Straight Path” of Islam. 
Wahhabism consistently applied a 
literal approach to understanding Islam 
and hence claimed an authenticity 
that was believed when Islamic 
identity was contested. In addition, 
the advocates of Wahhabism rejected 
being called followers of any Muslim 
figures, including Ibn al-Wahhab. They 
emphasized that they only followed 
Salaf al-Shalih (the Prophet and his 
companions) and hence, the Wahhabi 
group was able to use the category of 
Salafism.    
As a movement in the early 20th 
century, the term Salafi was used with 
a liberal orientation by Al-Afghani, 
Muhammad Abduh and Rasyid Ridha. 
They used it to respond to modernity’s 
demands when they called for a return 
Qur’anic verses or hadits (the Prophet 
sayings) regarding the attributes of 
Allah. This was the main root of Salafi 
groups.
Ibn al-Wahhab differed from 
Ibn Taymiyah and Ibn Al-Qayyim in 
understanding shari’ah. Ibn al-Wahhab 
inherited previous people’s tendency 
to interpret shari’ah literally, by 
denying discussion regarding various 
goals, meanings and reasons behind 
the shari’a laws. Hence, salafi groups 
denied it, Abu Fadhal said that Salafi 
and Wahhabi are the same movement. 
In the 18th Century, Muhammad ibn 
Abdul Wahhab created Wahhabism in 
Jazirah Arabia. He attempted to purify 
Islam from syirk, bid’ah and khurafat, 
thereby he acknowledged had infiltrated 
into the religion. He applied a strict 
literal approach that made texts as the 
only source of valid authority and was 
extremely hostile to intellectualism, 
mysticism, and all other sects in Islam.     
At the end of 18th Century, the 
Saud family were incorporated into the 
Wahabbi movement and rebelled toward 
Utsmaniyah domination in Jazirah 
Arabia. This rebellion was filled with 
bloodshed because Wahhabi people 
slaughtered Muslims and non-Muslims 
without discrimination. At that time, the 
popular ulemas were Hanafi bin Abidin 
and Malik Al-Sawi called Wahabbi as 
modern khawarij, as well as condemned 
its fanaticism and intolerance. In 
1818, Muhammad Ali lead an army to 
extinguish the rebellion and it seems 
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in the Middle East consists of five 
groups (al-Qardhawi 2003). The 
first group, ‘Salafiyyun Sururiyyun’ 
referred to Muhammad Syurur Zen 
Al-Abidin. This group has a political 
orientation and inherited ideas of the 
Brotherhood. This Salafi group resisted 
the presence of the United States 
and its military intervention in Gulf 
War II. The second group, ‘Salafiyun 
Al-Albaniyun’ followed Shaikh Al-
Muhaddist Nashiruddin Al-Al-Bani. 
This group resisted mazhab fanaticism 
and rejected taklid (blindly following 
without thinking rationally) even for 
lay people. However, at the same time, 
this Salafi group blindly followed all 
opinions of Al-Albani and proclaimed 
themselves as “the fifth Mazhab”. The 
third group, ‘Salafiyun Al-Jamiyun’ 
referred to Shaikh Rabi’ Al-Madkhali. 
This group often blamed and attacked 
all ulemas and dais with different ideas 
to them. The fourth group, ‘Salafiyun of 
Shaikh Abdurrahman Abdul Khalik’ in 
Kuwait and the Fifth group ‘Salafiyun 
of Saikh bin Baz and Shaikh Utsaimin’ 
in Arab Saudi have not yet established 
themselves as an organised Jemaah.
Salafi-Wahhabi movement was 
promoted in Indonesia in the second 
half of the 1980s (Hasan 2007; Rahmat 
2017). In the 1980s, this movement 
faced an obstacle because the Suharto 
regime opposed Islamic groups that 
were assumed to have had a political 
agenda, such as establishment of an 
Islamic state, which was different 
to al-Qur’an and Sunnah and applied 
it in interpretation of the texts. The 
main driver of this Salafiyah movement 
was Muhammad Rasyid Ridha (the 
founder of Al-Manar magazine). He 
was influenced by Muhammad Abduh 
who had an open attitude toward 
western ideas. This was the reason that 
Rasyid Ridha was not acknowledged 
by modern Salafiyun. In other words, 
they don’t follow Rasyid Ridha’s 
reformation, although he was the true 
leader of the enlightenment of Salafiyah.
In the early 1970s, Wahhabi had 
transformed Salafism from a liberal 
modern theology into a literalist, 
puritan and conservative theology. The 
rise in fuel prices in 1975 made Arab 
Saudi had access to a lot of money 
that allowed them to promoted global 
Wahhabism. Salafi-Wahhabi is the 
first group calling for ‘deculturation’ 
and ‘derationalisation’ in Islamic 
ideas and movements. They called 
for Islamic purification through a 
return to al-Qur’an and Sunnah. They 
implemented an agenda to tackle local 
culture that had been accommodated 
to by Muslims, and to the spiritualist 
tradition of mysticism. At the same 
time, Salafi prohibited using rationalism 
and preferred literal interpretation of 
al-Qur’an and Sunnah (prophet deeds). 
In addition, they even assumed that the 
classic ulemas’s books had been written 
by humans and therefore fouled the 
pristine Islam that had come from Allah.
The contemporary Salafiyah 
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Thalib and Yusuf Usman Baisa. These 
figures have worked on spreading salafi 
ideology through Islamic boarding 
schools, mosques and book publications 
(Rahmat 2017). 
In its development, Salafi Jemaah 
in Indonesia was divided into two 
camps: one group referred to Kuwaiti 
organisations, such as Abdul Hakim, 
Yusuf Baisa and Abu Nida, and 
the other group referred to Saudi 
organisations, namely, Ja’far Umar 
Thalib. The divisions occurred because 
Thalib protested the statement by Yusuf 
Baisa that in order to spread Salafi a 
system of organization similar to that of 
the Ikhwanul Muslimin was required. 
This should follow the wisdom of 
Jemaah Tablighi and make Salafiyah as 
aqidah underpinnings. Another reason 
was that Yusuf Baisa taught ideas of the 
figures of Salafi Surruriyun that were 
close with the Ikhwanul Muslimin. 
Thalib assessed this as a deviation from 
pristine Salafi. The peak of hostility 
occurred when Thalib established 
Laskar Jihad Ahlus Sunnah walJamaah. 
In the camp of Yusuf Baisa, Abu Nida 
and Abdul Hakim assessed the Thalib 
act as a deviation, because it violated 
two principles of Salafi Da’wa; JUT had 
played political games and had been 
trapped for hizbiyyah  because it created 
a mass organisation. In addition, Laskar 
Jihad had been involved in communal 
conflict in the Moluccas and Poso, 
Indonesia (Hasan 2009, Van Klinken 
2007).      
to the regime. In the 1990s, Suharto 
implemented political accommodation 
by approaching Islamic groups, 
including Salafi groups that had an 
opportunity to disseminate their ideas. 
The Reformation era (1998 onward) 
paved the way for Salafi groups to 
spread their influences in Java and in 
many cities of Indonesia, including 
Papua. During this era, Salafi-Wahhabi 
activists in Indonesia started building 
Islamic boarding schools based on 
Salafi ideology and used books written 
by Salafi figures such as Muhammad 
Nashiruddin Al-Bani and Bin Baz.
The Salafi movement in Indonesia 
has attempted to purify Muslim’s 
aqidah. The movement has undertaken 
campaigns to liberate Muslims from 
“viruses” that have contaminated 
pristine Islam, such as tasawwuf, 
tawasul, rationalism, Shi’ite teaching 
and many religious practices that 
were assumed as bid’ah. Hence, the 
movement problematized and revived 
the issues that were brought to the fore 
by puritans groups in the early 20th 
Century.
Salafi used three institutions to 
promote and spread its ideas: Islamic 
boarding schools, mosques and 
universities. In order to do this, they 
received donations from Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait. Some notable figures of 
the salafi movement in Indonesia are 
Abdul Hakim Abdat, Yasid Jawaz, 
Abu Nida, Farid Okbah, Ainul Harist, 
Abu Bakar M. Altway, Ja’far Umar 
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(GIDI) group that attacked the Tolikara 
Muslims. In addition, JUT claimed the 
Government of Indonesia as a kafir 
(infidel) government (Al-Makassary, 
2017). 
Two months after the Incident, 
JUT ordered two of his followers going 
to Papua to look for land to set up 
pesantren (Islamic Boarding School). 
In October 2015, both arrived and 
found a rented house in Koya Barat, 
Muaratami District, Jayapura. The 
district is located near to the border of 
Papua New Guinea. Koya Barat can 
be reached by bus or car about an hour 
from Jayapura. For years, Muslims 
transmigrants from Jawa have lived 
with indegenous Papuan Christians in 
communal harmony. 
Muslim community accepted 
JUT’s member after staying two months 
in Koya Barat, Muaratami District 
in Jayaputra city. Fauzi, one of the 
members, had given sermons frequently 
in mosque Al Muhajirin including eight 
mushallas. As a result, many Muslims 
were attracted with Fauzi’s Islamic 
teaching. After settling in Koya, Fauzi 
contacted JUT and in November 2015, 
JUT and his 40 santris (disciples) came 
secretly.
What were the motives of JUT 
and his disciples to come to Papua? 
In the meeting with a team created by 
the Mayor of Jayapura, JUT said his 
presence was to establish a pesantren 
because morals of the Indonesian nation 
were broken and it will be healed from 
Recently, Salafi transformed itself 
to move beyond the categorization of 
Salafi made by Qardhawi. Despite the 
general tendency of Salafi to be a non-
political group, they were assumed to 
play political games as bid’ah, which 
have been supported by Saudi Arabia. 
There are Salafi that have radical 
ideology, namely, Salafi Jihadis and 
Salafi Takfiri, both of which have been 
accused of conducting terrorist acts 
in the world, including in Indonesia 
(Rahmat 2017). 
Overall, the Salafi Da’wa 
movement has spread throughout 
Indonesia, including to Papua because 
of the aggressive da’i. In addition, the 
support of a transnational network with 
facility and funding will make the Salafi 
movement stronger and will challenge 
mainstream moderate Muslims, 
especially NU and Muhammadiyah as 
representative organisations for Islam in 
Indonesia.
Salafi Faction Jafar Umar Thalib 
in Papua
On 15 July 2015, the Tolikara 
incident occurred and drew attention 
globally and nationally. Some Muslims 
in Indonesia, without knowing the 
case comprehensively, were angry 
and condemned the event. On 20 July 
2015, Jafar Umar Thalib (JUT) issued 
the declaration of Jihad Fisabilillah to 
Papua. The content of the declaration 
was firm that is the proclaiming war 
against the Gereja Injili Di Indonesia 
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and challenged traditional religious 
corpus. The understanding of the 
Wahhabis became the foundations of 
the santri to learn any subject in Islam, 
including fiqh, hadits and da’wa.  
JUT and his disciples not only 
teach Islamic ideas based on Wahhabi 
understanding, but also distribute 
books entitled Jihad Fisabilillah and 
The Black Notes of Shia Religion 
and videos which were related to the 
Wahhabi’s teaching to Muslims living 
in Koya Barat and its surroundings. 
According to my informant, JUT had 
built up his prestige through teaching 
and distributing his books. Hence, some 
Muslims in Koya perceived him as a 
hero for Muslims in Papua.
On 11 June 2017, HTI held the 
Nuzulul Quran at mosque Al Muhajirin, 
Koya Barat, JUT and Hizbut Tharir 
Indonesia (HTI) Chapter Papua were 
collaborated. On that occasion, JUT 
delivered a speech which was not only 
a normative one but also a controversial 
one. For example, JUT said “Muslims 
are forbidden to make contact like 
riding a motorcycle or chatting in 
tandem with adult women who are not 
muhrim, because it is illegal”. Some 
of the teachings conveyed in the open 
discussion will invite tension not only 
among the Muslims, but also the non-
Muslims who are the majority in Papua.
Principally, the main idea of JUT’s 
arrival is to set up a pesantren. In doing 
so, since staying in Koya Barat, JUT 
and his disciples were busy looking 
Papua. JUT did not mention the Tolikara 
incident as a main reason that brought 
him to come to Papua. In addition, JUT 
stated “The Mollucas conflict was his 
past and now he wanted to preach to 
Indonesian people through education 
from Papua”.
However, the Tolikara Incident 
was an obvious reason for JUT to come 
to Papua. We noted, in responding 
to the Tolikara incident, JUT echoed 
the declaration of Jihad Fisabillillah 
to Papua, as mentioned above. In this 
sense, Abu Yahya, a member of JUT, 
justified this reason by saying that 
JUT was “seeing” Papua as a place for 
jihad because of the Tolikara incident. 
Fortunately, the Indonesian Government 
handled the incident quickly. In this 
regard, Abu Yahya said “If the Tolikara 
incident was not resolved, JUT had 
given command to 50 members for 
doing Jihad to burn entire churches in 
Papua”. 
JUT started preaching Islamic 
ideas based on Wahhabi in Keerom 
and its surrounding. Usually, he gives 
sermons after Subuh prayers in some 
mosques, espeacially in Masjid Al-
Muhajirin Koya Barat. Principally, 
JUT’s teachings are based on Wahhabi 
teachings. In the same vein, Hasan 
(2009) stated that the education system 
in JUT’s pesantren in Yogyakarta and 
some pesantren affiliated with JUT is 
conservative, thereby the educators 
deny teachings and activities that have 
been contaminated by Western culture 
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experience in the Afghanistan war 
against the Soviet Union. Starving for 
logistical support was the cause of the 
defeat of the Soviet army. So, JUT will 
establish pesantren with the concept 
of agriculture, plantation and animal 
husbandry to meet their own logistical 
needs. So, the incident that afflicted the 
Soviet troops in Afghanistan did not 
happen”. In this regard, it seems that 
JUT is preparing for a conflict between 
Muslims and Christians in the future.
To manage the building of the 
pesantren, JUT chose his son, Amir 
Thalib. Four santris and two craftsmen 
have assisted Amir. The name of the 
pesantren is Ihya Us Sunnah, the 
same name of JUT’s pesantren in 
Yogyakarta. However, in establishing 
his first pesantren in Keerom, JUT has 
gotten much resistance from Muslim 
communities. 
       Participant’s reactions in 
Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesia 
Ulama Council) meeting in Jayapura 
with JUT in 2015 were varied. A young 
Muslim while trembling delivered his 
strong protest by saying JUT’s arrival 
will bring worry within religious 
communities in Papua. Fadhal Alhamid, 
the name of the young Muslim, added 
“An attempt to maintain peace in 
Papua will be harder if JUT operates 
in Papua”. Another young Muslim told 
his story about his experience living 
in his society at the village of Walesi, 
Wamena. He said, some Christians 
and Muslims live in the same house 
for a suitable place to realize the idea 
in the Keerom regency that shares a 
border with Papua New Guinea. This 
region has many Muslim transmigrants 
especially from Java that work for 
trading, farming and fishing. Now, 
the percentage between Muslims and 
Papuan Christians is 40:60. But my 
informant said “In reality Muslims are 
more in number than Christians”. 
In the beginning, JUT planned 
to buy land in Arso 1 but he faced 
obstacles from the land owner and the 
leader of the ethnic tribe (ondoafi). 
Finally, JUT bought 26.5 hectares in 
Arso 14. He will be dividing the land 
for building of the Pesantren on five 
hectares; for agriculture, four hectares; 
for plantations, ten hectares; and for 
farms, seven and a half hectares. In 
addition, JUT bought 200 hectares that 
will be used for sugar cane farming. 
In this regard, my informant said JUT 
bought land which was costly. He 
added, “We do not know about the 
sources of the funds. We heard JUT 
got it from the political elite in Jakarta. 
But this needs more clarification”. In 
addition, the purpose of buying the land 
also was misused by JUT. A senior staff 
at the local government in Jayapura, 
Evert Meraudje, said “JUT bought 
land for farming and he changed it for 
building the pesantren”.
JUT planned, after establishing 
pesantren in Arso 14, to establish 20 
pesantrens in Papua. According to my 
informant, “This is based on JUT’s 
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that tended to claim they were more 
innocent and more truthful than others 
like JUT’s teachings. 
Conclusion
In the midst of the failure of the 
nation-state, with which transnational 
Islam are often seen as “enemies of 
the state”, due to some of their actors 
promote Islamic caliphate or Islamic 
state. Transnational Islamic actors 
are very diverse, from those who 
pursue jihadist paths such as al-Qaida, 
Salafi jihadists to piety, khilfatis like 
Hizbut Tharir and apolitism like 
Jemaah Tabligh. In Indonesia the term 
transnational Islam emerged in the late 
1970s and thereafter many studies have 
been published. 
In Papua, the study of transnational 
Islam is still limited. Based on the above 
discussion, the presence of JUT and his 
disciples in Papua (Jayapura, Sentani 
and Keerom), had sparked tension 
within Muslims and non-Muslims. In 
particular, a plan to establish pesantren 
as a site of preaching Wahhabi Salafi 
triggered strong protest from MUI, 
Papuan Christians and Islamic mass 
organisations. In reality, JUT and his 
disciples are enduring in Keerom and 
teaching their Islamic ideas. 
The current situation shows that 
JUT got many supporters from some 
Muslims and the local government 
elite and the Chief of Police in 
Keerom. My informant told me that 
JUT started working again on building 
together. Some participants argued 
that they do not want JUT’s arrival 
to exacerbate good communications 
amongst interfaith and family 
relationship. In short, all participants 
agreed to reject JUT’s planning to set up 
his pesantren (Al-Makassary, 2017).
Participant’s rejection of JUT’s 
arrival were based on some reasons: 
First, JUT’s track record was filled with 
violence and intolerant acts in Ambon 
and Yogyakarta. Muslims in Papua do 
not want religious conflict to happen in 
Papua such as Moluccas conflict that 
involved JUT and his Laskar Jihad. 
Second, communal harmony amongst 
Muslim groups in Papua is good 
without an attempt to call them infidels 
or blame other groups. Third, JUT’s 
attitude in his declaration “War against 
pluralism” is denying of Sunatullah 
(Allah’s will) and it will create tension 
with non-Muslims in Papua. 
In the same vein, the chairman of 
MUI Papua, Uztad Al-Payage, said, 
“We have seen that the way JUT is 
doing his da’wa is not relevant with 
the situation in Papua. Here people are 
diverse and do not blame each other. In 
one family there can be many religions. 
Hence JUT’s method in da’wa is not 
relevant”. 
Overall, considering all suggestions 
from participants in the meeting, MUI 
Papua released the recommendation 
that JUT needs to leave Papua. Muslim 
groups in Papua can maintain their 
religion without intervention of groups 
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harmony.
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the construction of his pesantren. He 
said “A lot of materials and heavy 
vehicles are in the construction site”. 
At the same time, the third letter by 
the former Major of Keerom was not 
applied to JUT. Hence, JUT’s presence 
and his endurance to preach his radical 
Islamic ideas as perceived, will destroy 
the vision of “Papua Land of Peace”, 
thereby religious leaders and society in 
Papua agreed to maintain communal 
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